Not Yet Friends, But Already Partners

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Evgenia Karezina
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In the early years following Ukraine’s liberation from German occupation, religious life within Orthodox parishes experienced a notable revival. Contributing factors included the authorities' relatively more favorable policies toward the Church and the desire of both clergy and laity to find their place in the societal and spiritual life of a nation victorious over its enemy. During the fight against fascism, when enduring the hardships of war, most of the population did not divide their comrades into believers and non-believers. As is often said, shared adversity can bring people together, but so can shared triumph over a common foe. What, then, were the collaborative efforts undertaken by the Church and government authorities in this new era of peace?

Reports from regional representatives to the Commissioner of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (henceforth referred to as the "Council") in Ukraine provide insight. The reconstruction of the war-torn economy demanded significant resources, and the material contributions of parishes to the country's collective effort became a central theme in these reports.

“Patriotic activity among the clergy and the collection of funds in churches for patriotic purposes have intensified,” reported the Commissioner for the Ukrainian SSR, Khodchenko, in his second-quarter report for 1946. “All gross proceeds from churches in the Kharkiv Diocese on the day of the religious feast of the Annunciation were allocated to the patriotic fund. In the second quarter of 1946, parish communities in the Kharkiv Diocese deposited 560,700 rubles into a special State Bank account…

In response to the government's announcement of a state loan for the reconstruction and development of the national economy, Bishop Mikhail assigned specific subscription quotas to each deanery, who, in turn, conveyed these quotas to individual parishes. For example, parishes in the Kherson Diocese were tasked with collectively raising 500,000 rubles. The vast majority of parishes fulfilled the bishop’s quota, with some already paying in full and submitting the bonds to the diocesan administration for subsequent transfer to the state.” (State Archive of the Russian Federation [GARF], F. 6991, Op. 1, D. 101, L. 71–88).

Officials also noted instances where parish leaders called on their congregations to participate actively in agricultural campaigns and collective farm work:

“For example, Father Syusyura from the village of Rubanovka in the Bolshaya Lepetikha district structured his Easter service so that it concluded around 3 a.m., after which he urged all believing kolkhoz workers to take part in sowing and other agricultural tasks, where the kolkhoz was lagging behind. His appeal was not without results, though some in the church community expressed dissatisfaction with his actions. Father Syusyura himself participates in kolkhoz work, as do a few others who follow his example.

Similarly, Father Shevelev from the parish in the village of Novaya Alekseevka in the Genichesk district submitted an official statement to the diocesan administration from the head of the Chervona Khvilya kolkhoz, confirming that he and his family contributed 330 labor days in 1945 while continuing to fulfill his pastoral duties.” (GARF, F. 6991, Op. 1, D. 101, L. 81–88, Kherson Region).

However, archival correspondence also reveals documented cases of local authorities pressuring clergy to purchase state bonds, which prompted harsh criticism from higher-level officials. For example, the Ukrainian Commissioner condemned such practices in Kherson:

"Demanding bond subscriptions from clergy under threat, even at midnight, is an unprecedented discreditation of Soviet authority!" (GARF, F. 6991, Op. 1, D. 101, L. 71–80).

Reports often detailed how the Church financially supported societal causes:

“In June of this year, the bishop allocated 75,000 rubles to public needs: 40,000 rubles for the regional health campaign for children orphaned during the war, 25,000 rubles to assist war veterans, and 10,000 rubles to support orphanages.” (Kherson Region).

Regional commissioners also highlighted instances of clergy supporting government initiatives through spiritual means. For example, ahead of elections to the Supreme Soviet, priests in Donetsk delivered sermons urging congregants to vote unanimously for the candidates of the Communist and Non-Party Bloc. (GARF, F. 6991, Op. 1, D. 101, L. 48).

Father Pyotr Melnik of the Donetsk Diocese proposed that clergy focus on topics such as the new five-year plan, rebuilding infrastructure, and improving public health. He even suggested publishing exemplary sermons on these subjects in Orthodox periodicals. (GARF, F. 6991, Op. 1, D. 101, L. 50).

While reports frequently highlighted the Church’s contributions, they seldom mentioned reciprocal support from the government for Church needs. Exceptions included cases where local authorities allocated resources for church repairs or recognized churches as cultural landmarks.

Documents from this period reveal a complex interplay between the Church and the Soviet state, characterized by cautious cooperation and mutual suspicion. While a shared desire to rebuild the nation created opportunities for collaboration, underlying tensions foreshadowed future conflicts. By 1946, early signs of a cooling in Church-State relations were already evident.

Perhaps a more amicable state policy toward the Church could have altered the trajectory of Orthodox communities in the USSR. However, as history reminds us, the past offers no conditional tense. The postwar years were only the beginning of a long and complicated journey in the relationship between the state and its faithful citizens.

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